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[L. A. No. 22062. In Bank. July 31, 1952.]

JOHN J. McMAHON, Petitioner, v. STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA, Respondent.
[1a, 1b] Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Professional Misconduct.-Attorney's conduct in causing allegation of intestacy to be prepared and presented to probate court is an
infraction of the rules of professional conduct (State Bar
Act, §§ 6067, 6068, 6103, 6106), where he had previously been
informed of the execution of a will and of the name of the
attorney who prepared it and who had a copy in his files, had
knowledge of the general contents of the will, knew the person
who had been given original possession thereof, relied on
information that the special administrator and an attorney
connected with decedent's family did not know of the existence
of a will after searching for one, and made no effort to ascertain the existence of the will by inquiry of the one in whose
possession it had been placed.
[2] Wills-Testamentary Writings.-Even though the dispositive
provisions of a will may be invalid, as where it fails to provide
for a person later determined to be a pretermitted heir, the
will is operative if it merely appoints an executor, and is
entitled to probate for purposes of administration of the estate.
[3] Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Defenses.-Attorney's
conduct in withholding from court what knowledge he had
concerning the execution of a will when he presented a petition
alleging intestacy is not justified by the fact that he had no
self-serving motive in withholding such information, but was
primarily interested in getting his client, decedent's brother,
appointed special administrator before a sister who had been
named executrix in the will could obtain possession of the
assets of the estate, because in prior litigation involving the
estate of another sister such brother, also appointed special
administrator of such estate, had been unable to get possession
of the assets due to their alleged wrongful appropriation by
the sister first mentioned.
[4] Decedents' Estates-Compensation of Attorneys-Extraordinary Services.-Attorneys for special administrators are within
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1949 Rev), Practice of Law, § 43
et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Wills, § 186; Am.Jur., Wills, § 27.
[ 4] See Cal.Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 1051; Am.Jur.,
Executors and Administrators, §§ 517, 545 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 5] Attorneys, § 136; [2] Wills, § 199;
[3] Attorneys, § 151; [ 4] Decedents' Estates, § 852.
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the purview of Prob. Code, § 910, declaring that attorneys for
executors and administrators may be allowed as fees "such
further amount as the court may deem just and reasonable
for extraordinary services."
[5] Attorneys- Disciplinary Proceedings- Professional Misconduct.-Attorney's conduct in demanding and receiving from
special administrator fees for extraordinary services without a
prior court order is not an infraction of the rules of professional conduct (State Bar Act, §§ 6067, 6068, 6103, 6106),
where a large portion of the money so paid to the attorney
was in turn paid out by him to satisfy legitimate costs incurred
in the interests of the estate and a pretermitted heir, all
payments out of the estate were made with the knowledge
and consent of the pretermitted heir who eventually succeeded
to the entire estate, the amount received by the attorney for
his own use was not unreasonable compensation for the amount
of legal services rendered by him, he was advised by other
attorneys that his demand and acceptance of such fees were
legally proper, and other circumstances sustain an inference
of good faith on his part.

PROCEEDING to review a recommendation of suspension
of an attorney for six months. Petitioner suspended for 60 days.
John J. McMahon, in pro. per., John F. Poole and R. Milton
Smith for Petitioner.
Jerold E. Weil, Byron 0. Smith and Albert E. Wheatcroft
for Respondent.
'l'HE COURT-The petitioner, John J. McMahon, seeks
a review of a recommendation of the Board of Governors
of the State Bar that he be suspended from the practice of the
law for a period of six months. The Board of Governors
adopted and approved findings of fact of a Local Administrative Committee.
The facts underlying the recommendation are as follows:
One Rae S. Merrill died in Arizona in April, 1944, leaving
property in California. Later in April the petitioner as attorney for Fred B. Merrill, a brother of the decedent, instituted proceedings for the administration of the estate,
resulting in the appointment of Fred as special administrator.
The petition for special letters of administration alleged on
information and belief that the decedent had died intestate.
The Local Administrative Committee and the Board of Governors found that the petitioner herein, who had prepared
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but not signed the petition .for special letters of administration, knew that a will had theretofore been executed and that
he knew its contents including the identity of the beneficiaries
and the executrix named therein, although he did not know
it was actually in existence at the time of the decedent's
death. The Board of Governors further found that the petitioner had information indicating that the allegations of
intestacy on information and belief were not justified. This
alleged infraction of the rules of professional conduct constitutes the basis of Count One of the charges piaced against
the petitioner.
Count Two charges that the petitioner had embarked upon
a program of harassment consisting of a series of proceedings instituted to delay the appointment of the named executrix under the will of the decedent. Both the Local .Administrative Committee and the Board of Governors found that
the petitioner had not engaged in such a program, and this
charge is not now urged by respondent.
Petitioner's client was removed as special administrator
on October 18, 1945, and the named executrix was granted
letters testamentary the following day. Count Three alleges,
and the Local .Administrative Committee and the Board of
Governors found, that during the time that he was acting
as attorney for the administrator the petitioner demanded
and received payment from his client out of funds belonging
to the estate sums totalling approximately $4,059.40 for extraordinary legal services and costs. The total assets of the
estate amounted to the sum of $7,199.90. The findings recite
that these payments were demanded and received "in bad
faith" by the petitioner and without request for an order of
the court or approval by the court, except as to the sum of
$33.10, for which an order was obtained.
Two questions are presented: (1) Did the petitioner have
sufficient information concerning the existence of a will which
should forbid the allegations of intestacy which he caused to
be presented to the court; and (2) did the petitioner exercise
bad faith in demanding and accepting fees for extraordinary
services without a prior order of the court?
If either or both of these inquiries are answered in the
affirmative this disciplinary proceeding was justified. (State
Bar .Act, §§ 6067, 6068, 6103 and 6106.)
The petitioner contends that he has committed no infraction of the professional rules of conduct and that the facts
do not support the findings and recommendations.
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[la] There is credible evidence that prior to the time of
the filing of the petition for special letters of administration
the petitioner had been informed of the execution of the will
"a year or so before" by the decedent; that he was informed
of the name of the attor:ney who had prepared the will and
who had a copy in his files; that he had knowledge of the
general contents of the will and that he knew of the person
who had been given original possession of the will. The petitioner admits knowledge of the existence of a copy of the
will but asserts a belief claimed to be reasonable that the will
was no longer in existence ; or that if it were it could not be
probated as the testator was incompetent at the time of its
execution; or that in any event the will was invalid and inoperative due to the claim of a pretermitted heir who would
take as sole heir.
The petitioner had no affirmative knowledge of the destruction of the will. He relied on information that the special
administrator and an attorney connected with the decedent's
family did not know of the existence of a will after spending
two hours in a search for one. He made no effort to ascertain
the existence of the original will by inquiry of the one in
whose possession it had been placed. The petitioner's insistence that he did not affirmatively know of the will avoids the
fact that he had actual notice that one had been executed.
He asserts that the only evidence of notice on his part of the
existence of the will is the testimony of the complaining witness, the special administrator, and that this witness had been
impeached. However, the petitioner's own testimony reveals
that he relied upon knowledge that the will did not provide
for a pretermitted heir in seeking to justify his conduct and
he admits that he "knew of a copy of a will." He is not
charged with knowledge of a will, but that he was "possessed
of such information as should have placed him on inquiry
as to the existence of a will . . . " It was charged that he
caused to be filed the petition for special letters in which
it was alleged under oath: ''That due search and inquiry had
been made to ascertain if said deceased left any will and
testament, but none has been found, and according to the
best knowledge, information and belief of your petitioner,
said deceased died intestate."
[2] The petitioner's contention that he could ignore the
will due to its failure to provide for a person later determined
to be a pertermitted heir, cannot be sustained. Even though
the dispositive provisions of a will may be invalid the will
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is operative if it' merely appoints an executor, and is entitled
to probate for purposes of administration of the estate.
(In re Hickman, 101 Cal. 609, 613 [36 P. 118] ; Estate of
Philippi, 71 Cal..App.2d 127 [161 P.2d 1006].)
[3] The petitioner contends that he had no self-serving
motive in withholding such knowledge as he had. His argument is, and the record reveals, that he was primarily interested in getting his client Fred Merrill appointed special
administrator before Helen Hillin could obtain possession of
the assets of the estate. Helen Hillin is a sister of Fred. She
was also a sister of the decedent and had been named executrix in the will of which the petitioner had notice. Mrs. Hillin
had gone to Arizona to attend the funeral of the decedent and
was expected back shortly. It was in her possession that the
will was reputed to have been placed. In prior litigation Fred
had been appointed special administrator of the estate of
Blanche Merrill, another sister, and had been unable to get
possession of the assets of that estate due to the alleged wrongful appropriation of those assets by Helen Hillin. The petitioner contends that the prior conduct of Mrs. Hillin showed
that she was an improper person to administer the estate of
the decedent; that he procured the appointment of Fred
Merrill as special administrator in order to protect the interests of the pretermitted heir; that the appointment of
Fred facilitated proceedings in a pending action in which
the petitioner was seeking to partition property jointly held
by members of the Merrill family, and that it permitted Fred
as administrator of the estate of the decedent to be made coplaintiff with Fred personally. Prior to this time the petitioner, who represented Fred in the partition suit against
the other three then-living members of the family, had been
unable to obtain service on the decedent who had been named
as a defendant.
The foregoing considerations cannot serve as justification
on the part of the petitioner for withholding from the court
what knowledge he had concerning the existence of a wilL
[lb] In causing the allegation of intestacy to be alleged
and presented to the court, he was, therefore, guilty of conduct denounced by the statute, and the first question must be
answered in the affirmative.
Count Three in effect charg·es that the petitioner unjustifiably demanded and received from the special administrator
fees for extraordinary services without a prior court order.
[4] Section 910, Probate Code, provides in part as follows:
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''Attorneys for executors and administrators shall be allowed out of the estate, as fees . . . such further amount as
the court may deem just and reasonable for extraordinary
services.''
Attorneys for special administrators are within the purview of the statute. (Estate of Kafitz, 51 Cal.App. 325, 330
[196 P. 790] .) [5] The petitioner did not seek or obtain
an order of court authorizing the payment of the fees to him.
He urges as justification that the amounts thereof were agreed
upon by the special administrator and that he had an arrangement with the pertermitted and sole heir of the decedent for
such payments. It is true that a large portion of the money
so paid to the petitioner was in turn paid out by him to satisfy
legitimate costs incurred in the interests of the estate and the
pretermitted heir. It is also true, according to the record
herein, that all payments out of the estate were made with
the knowledge and consent of the pretermitted heir who eventually succeeded to the entire estate. However, she later brought
an action against the petitioner and the special administrator jointly for misappropriation of funds and was successful in obtaining a judgment for the return to the estate of
the sum of $3,750. The petitioner was not served in that action
and the judgment was satisfied by the special administrator
by payment out of his own funds. Thereafter the special
administrator was instrumental in causing the present disciplinary proceedings to be brought.
The petitioner is not charged with receiving exorbitant
fees. Certain it is, from the record, that whatever he received
for his own use was not unreasonable compensation for the
great amount of legal services rendered by him in good faith
on behalf of the estate in a long series of legal actions and
proceedings.
The petitioner urges, as further justification, that he consulted and was advised by other attorneys that his demand
and acceptance of such fees were legally proper and that if
he honestly believed that he was entitled to extraordinary
fees without an order of court he should not be found
guilty of bad faith in obtaining them. He relies upon the
Estate of Lankershim, 6 Cal.2d 568, 571 [58 P.2d 1282],
as authority for the proposition that an attorney may demand
and receive fees for extraordinary services with the consent
of all interested parties and without an order of court. In
that case the court affirmed an allowance of fees in the following language: " . . . [T]he trial court found and fixed

July 1952]

McMAHON v. STATE BAR
[39 C.2d 367; 246 P.2d 931]

373

the amount
of attorney's fees to be allowed Mr. McDonald in the sum of $56,443.15, minus the sum of $10,000
which had been paid him on account of such fees prior to the
filing of the accounts." No other re:ference is made in the
opinion to the $10,000.
The petitioner says he also relied upon other authority.
He cites 2 Bancroft Probate, page 831, section 444, where it
is stated: "An executor or administrator, having funds of
the estate in his possession, unquestionably has the physical
power to pay funds to his attorney for services rendered by
the latter . . . Moreover, . . . though he has made such payment with funds of the estate and without authority of the
court . . . the attorney cannot be compelled to disgorge, the
matter being wholly between the representative and the
estate." He also refers to 33 Corpus Juris Secundum where
it is said at page 1214 (citing Ludwig V. s~lperior Court, 217
Cal. 499 [ 19 P .2d 984], as supporting authority) : "A representative need not secure permission of the court before
employing counsel, nor need he secure judicial approval before paying counsel fees. He proceeds at his own risk, however, if he does not first obtain such approval." The petitioner urges that a sole heir may, under the law, deal with the
property of an estate without administration and that the
transactions, as to the heir, become final, citing Phelps v.
Grady, 168 Cal. 73 [141 P. 926], and In re Welch, 110 Cal.
605 [42 P. 1089]. Whether the authorities relied upon by the
petitioner sustain his position need not be and is not decided. It is enough to say that all of the circumstances here
presented and considered are sufficient to rebut the inference
of bad faith and to sustain the inference of good faith to which
the petitioner is entitled under our statute. (Code of Civ.
Proc., § 1963, subds. 1, 19, 33.)
It is concluded that the petitioner, as charged in Count
One of the notice to .show cause, and as found by the Board
of Governors, had such information concerning the existence of a will of the decedent that he was not justified in
representing to the court that the decedent had died intestate; that the charge of "harassment" contained in Count
Two of the notice to show cause should be dismissed; that
the charge of "bad faith" on the part of the petitioner in
accepting the payment of fees for extraordinary services
prior to an order of the court, as charged in Count Three,
is not sustained by the evidence and should be dismissed.
In view of the fact that Counts 'l'wo and 'fhree should be dis-
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missed, we conclude that the ends of justice will best be
served by fixing 60 days as the time of suspension.
It is therefore ordered that Counts Two and Three of the
notice to show cause be, and the same are hereby, dismissed.
As to Count One it is ordered that the petitioner be suspended
from the practice of law in this state for the period of 60
days after this order becomes final.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
In my opinion the evidence is insufficient to show any misconduct on the part of petitioner or that he violated the rules
of professional conduct of the State Bar of California in any
respect, and I would, therefore, dismiss the entire proceeding against him.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied August
28, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition
should be granted.

[S. F. No. 18478. In Bank. July 31, 1952.]

OVE E. ERICKSEN, Respondent, v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC
COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant.
[1] Master and Servant-Federal Employers' Liability Act-Employees Within Act.-An employee whose duties are shown to
have had the effect on interstate commerce set forth in the
Federal Employers' Liability Act (35 Stats. 65; 45 U.S.C.A.
§51) is "deemed" to have been employed by a carrier engaged
in that commerce.
[2] !d.-Federal Employers' Liability Act-Employees Within
Act.-Employee eligible to benefits of Federal Employers'
Liability Act need not be a "railroader" exposed to the risks
peculiar to railroading, but may be any employee whose duties
further interstate commerce "or in any way directly or closely
and substantially" affect such commerce. (45 U.S.C.A. §51.)
[1] See Cal.Jur., Master and Servant,§ 58; Am.Jur., Master and
Servant, § 398.
McK. Dig, References: [1-3] Master and Servant, §202; [4]
Master and Servant, § 204(6); [5] Master and Servant,§ 204(4);
[6, 11] Master and Servant, § 203; [7-10] Master and Servant,
§ 200; [12] Damages, § 100.

